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Introduction
Economic development is an uneven process, characterized by severe inequalities in growth patterns across sectors and across space (Harris, 1985) . Theories of structural change typically explain the shift from agriculture to manufacturing and services that accompanies the development process as being triggered by increases in agricultural productivity ("push"), manufacturing productivity ("pull") or a combination of both (for an overview of the literature, see Matsuyama, 2008) . This paper contributes to the literature by demonstrating that, even in the absence of technological progress, asymmetric sectoral output growth and employment shifts can be induced by trade. Such shifts result in spatial disparities in economic activity that are qualitatively similar to those conventionally associated with rural transformation. By highlighting the possible role of preferences as part of the explanation for these disparities, the paper also aims to contribute to the New Economic Geography literature (see Krugman, 1998 , for an overview of this literature).
To demonstrate these e¤ects, we use a simple theoretical model to analyze the e¤ects of market integration on food and non-food production and the sectoral composition of employment in a poor rural setting, where utility is highly sensitive to food consumption. Our motivation for focusing on poor rural areas is twofold.
At the inception of the industrial revolution, most societies were rather poor and dominated by agriculture. Currently, diversi…cation beyond agriculture is often considered a promising way out of poverty for poor rural economies. Yet, in many countries, market fragmentation constrains the growth of the rural nonfarm sector (see e.g. Loening et al, 2008) . If people cannot trade, they have no choice but to produce what they need to eat. 1 We analyze the bene…ts of market integration and show that, under certain plausible assumptions, as trade is facilitated, output and employment in the non-food sector grow more quickly than output and employment in the food sector as trade. Sectoral growth patterns are thus asymmetric. A related result is that the non-farm sector may bene…t more from market integration than the farm sector.
The Model
We consider a setting in which there are two representative agents (communities) who are potential trading partners. We assume they produce, and consume, food and non-food products, and that they have Cobb-Douglas utility functions:
where C i F ; C i N F denote consumption of food and non-food products, respectively, for agent i, and a is a preference parameter bounded between 0 and 1. In rural areas of developing countries, where poverty is widespread and a substantial proportion of the population is malnourished, we think of a as being closer to 1 than 0, re ‡ecting a relatively high sensitivity of utility to changes in food consumption.
2 Each producer has a vector of product-speci…c productive skills denoted
, and production of food (F ) and non-food (N F ) products is given by
where i is the time (bounded between 0 and 1) agent i allocates to food production, which we shall refer to as the employment share of sector i. Thus there are missing. 2 Dasgupta and Ray (1986; 1987) discuss how physical wellbeing is highly sensitive to changes in nutritional intake at low nutrition levels, in their analysis of the e¤ects of inequality on malnutrition. Private consumption expenditure on food accounts for the bulk of consumer spending in the least developed countries (Grigg, 1994). are constant returns to scale in both sectors.
Under autarky, each agent has to produce the products to be consumed. It is straightforward to show that, in our model, the optimal amount of time allocated to producing food in autarky is i = a. Thus, if the preference parameter a is high, each agent will allocate most of his or her time producing food, independent of the underlying skills vector (A Now consider the e¤ects of integrating the market, enabling the two producers to trade with each other. Suppose that community 1 has a comparative advantage in the production of food, so that
This assumption is maintained throughout the analysis. We assume that the agents bargain over the total utility surplus generated by trade. The outside option in the bargaining game is the utility under autarky, denoted U i : In equilibrium, the Nash product
is maximized with respect to inputs 1 ; 2 . The solutions for 1 ; 2 are summarized in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 Optimal time allocation under trade is determined by preferences and productivity di¤erentials as follows:
Proof: See Appendix. Clearly, small changes in preferences can result in sharply discontinous patterns of spatial specialization, as preferences a are a key determinant of which solution will be optimal and thus of the sectoral composition of employment across communities.
3 Application: A poor rural economy Subject to the assumptions made, the results summarized in Proposition 1 are general. In the context of a poor rural economy, it seems reasonable to assume that utility is quite sensitive to food consumption (a close to 1), and that heterogeneity in productivity levels (skills) across agents is modest (A Proposition 1 that, under trade, community 1 will specialize in food production while community 2 will adopt a mixed production strategy. Now consider some implications for output and sectoral employment shares under this scenario.
E¤ects of shifting from autarky to trade on output.
We highlight two striking results. The …rst is that total volume of food produced is the same under trade as under autarky:
Total consumption of food will thus not change as a result of market integration.
The second result is that total volume of non-food produced is strictly higher under trade than under autarky:
hence the percentage growth in non-food output is
> 1 measures the comparative advantage of community 1 in food production. Thus, subject to A 1 F =A 2 F < a= (1 a), the more pronounced the comparative advantage in agriculture for community 1, and the higher the relative non-food productivity of community 1 to that of community 2, the higher the output gain from trade in the non-food sector. This e¤ect arises because the increase in the relative e¢ ciency with which non-food is produced resulting from trade exceeds the increase in the e¢ ciency with which non-food goods are produced.
Shifting from autarky to trade thus results in asymmetric growth: food output does not change; non-food output increases.
E¤ects of shifting from autarky to trade on sectoral employment shares.
The e¤ects on sectoral employment shares depend on absolute advantages. It follows from part 1 in Proposition 1 that if community 1 has an absolute advantage in food production, i.e. A Both the increase in non-farm output and the increase in the employment in the non-farm sector are consistent with historically documented patterns of rural transformation. Also note that the average productivity with which both farm and non-farm goods are produced rises.
A numerical example
We now illustrate these e¤ects by means of a simple numerical example. Suppose In autarky, we have i = 0:8 for i = 1; 2, hence total production is as follows: Once the agents engage in trade, the solution to the bargaining problem is such that production occurs in the points indicated by the solid large circle for producer 1, and the solid large diamond for producer 2. The terms of trade are determined as part of the bargaining process, and are shown in the graph by the gray dashed lines. Producer 1 thus consumes in the point indicated by the solid small circle, and producer 2 consumes in the point indicated by the small solid diamond. Both agents increase their consumption of nonfarm goods, and so total production of nonfarm products increases. The total level of food production and consumption is unchanged compared to autarky.
Generalized preferences
The above results are obtained under the assumption that the utility function is Cobb-Douglas. In cases where the elasticity of substitution is di¤erent from 1, the results will be di¤erent. Given our context, the substitutability between food and non-food products is probably rather limited. In the extreme case where the elasticity of substitution is zero (Leontief utility function), so that the ratio of food to non-food products consumed in equilibrium is constant, output in the two sectors will always grow at the same rate when shifting from autarky to trade.
Suppose the utility function exhibits constant elasticity of substitution (CES),
where r = (s 1) =s and s is the elasticity of substitution. Suppose s = 0:5, so that there is some substitutability, but less than under Cobb-Douglas preferences.
Using the same calibration as in the numerical example based on Cobb-Douglas preferences above, we then solve numerically for the e¤ects of trade on output.
We …nd that total food production grows by 5% (cf. 0% under Cobb-Douglas),
and that non-food output grows by 30% (cf. 50% under Cobb-Douglas). Thus, there is still asymmetric growth -the non-farm sector grows more quickly -but, this is less pronounced than under Cobb-Douglas preferences. For completeness we also consider s = 2, implying high substitutability between the two products (of course, it seems unlikely that individuals in a poor rural economy are willing to substitute food for non-food consumption at such a rapid rate). In this case.
the volume of food produced falls by 10%, whereas non-food production grows by 85%, when the economy shifts from autarky to trade.
Discussion
Our model is highly stylized. However, some of the mechanisms that we have abstracted from might enhance our results further. For example, Engel e¤ects, (which are often emphasized in the literature on structural change, see e.g. Matsuyama, 1992 , Laitner, 2000 , Caselli and Coleman, 2001 ) are likely to reinforce our results; if one of the e¤ects of market integration is to raise individuals' incomes and this in turn lowers the food preference parameter a (an Engel e¤ect) 3 , then this will enhance the pattern of asymmetric growth in non-farm production documented above. Alternatively, suppose the agents have Stone-Geary utility
where S is the subsistence level of food consumption. It is easy to verify that this speci…cation would only reinforce our …nding that trade stimulates the output of non-farm products and non-farm employment disproportionately (given reasonable choices of S). If in the numerical example above S = 0:35, the time allocation of producer 2 under autarky will change towards more production of food. The e¤ect of trade on total non-food production and non-farm employment will therefore be even greater than with conventional preferences.
Increasing returns to scale (Romer, 1987 , Krugman, 1991 
subject to 0 i 1. The Cobb-Douglas functional form implies that corner solutions can be ruled out. The …rst-order condition (f.o.c.) is :
which implies a = i :
A2. Optimal time allocation under trade. In equilibrium, the Nash product
is maximized with respect to inputs 1 ; 2 ; subject to
The resulting utility sharing rule implies:
Since the threat points U 1 ; U 2 are …xed, the time allocation parameters 1 ; 2 will be chosen in order to maximise total utility:
where F i ; N F i denote food and non-food consumption for producers i = 1; 2: Let F; N F denote total food and non-food production:
For any F; N F , optimal consumption is such that:
hence F 1 =N F 1 = F 2 =N F 2 = F=N F . It follows that producer i will consume the same share of total food production as of total non-food production:
where is determined by the bargaining process. The utility maximization problem therefore simpli…es to
subject to (1). Using the Cobb-Douglas functional form, and taking logarithms,
we thus obtain
subject to (1).
A2.1 Types of solutions.
The following table is useful for characterizing the types of solutions to the maximization problem above Table A1 -Types of solutions
Assume that producer 1 has a comparative advantage in the production of food,
It can then be seen immediately that the solutions A,C,E can never be optimal:
A & E result in zero consumption of one of the goods and so are inadmissible;
and C is always inferior to h. In what follows we …rst prove that B,F,D can never be optimal, leaving us with three types of solutions: g,h,i. We then derive the conditions determining which of the types g,h,i will be the optimal solution, depending on skills and preferences.
A2.2 Optimal 2 , conditional on 1 Suppose the solution for 2 is interior, 0 < 2 < 1. The f.o.c. with respect to 2 :
After some tedious algebra,we obtain the solution for 2 :
Provided the solution for 2 is interior, total food consumption is equal to
Total non-food consumption is equal to
Total utility is thus:
Di¤erentiate with respect to 1 :
where
is the ratio of the relative food-productivity of individual 1 to that of individual 2.
All terms on the right-hand side of (3) are non-negative. It follows that utility is a monotonic function of 1 , which implies the solution for 1 is a corner solution (specialization) whenever the solution for 2 is interior. This implies F in Table   A1 cannot be optimal. It also follows that R determines whether
or negative, i.e. whether 1 will be equal to one or zero:
Hence, if producer 1 has a comparative advantage in food production, B in Table   A1 cannot be optimal. A corollary is that, if 1 is interior, then 2 must be a corner solution, and since producer 2 has a comparative advantage in non-food production, 2 = 0 must be the solution in this case; hence D cannot be optimal.
A2.3 Distinguishing between potential solutions
The optimal solution will be such that it falls into one of the cells g,h,i shown in Table A2 : Table A2 -Remaining solutions 0 < 1 < 1 1 = 1 2 = 0 g h 0 < 2 < 1 Not optimal i
In regime i, we have
where the latter equation follows from (2). In this regime, then,
In regime g, we have
Producer 1 has a comparative advantage in food production, Note: The solid straight lines indicate the production possibility curves for the two hypothetical individuals discussed in the text, under autarky. The indifference curves are drawn for the Cobb Douglas utility function discussed in the text, with a = 0.8. Optimal production and consumption in autarky for individual 1 and 2 is indicated by the hollow small circle, and the hollow small diamond, respectively. Once the individuals engage in trade, the solution to the bargaining problem is such that production occurs in the points indicated by the solid large circle for individual 1, and the solid large diamond for individual 2. Individual 1 consumes in the point indicated by the solid small circle, and individual 2 consumes in the point indicated by the small solid diamond. The terms of trade are indicated by the gray dashed lines. Both individuals increase their consumption of nonfarm goods.
